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Perks for Prisoners who Pray: Using the Coercion
Test to Decide Establishment Clause Challenges to
Faith-Based Prison Units
RichardR. W. Fields

On Christmas Eve, 2003, Florida Governor Jeb Bush dedicated the nation's first faith-based prison.1 Officially dubbed a
"Faith and Character Institution,"2 Lawtey Correctional Facility
"aims to incorporate personal faith as a catalyst to effect inner
transformation of inmates and, thus, make the prison safer and
reduce recidivism."3 In April of 2004, Governor Bush opened a
second "Faith and Character Institution" for female inmates.4
The opening of these two prisons continues a trend started
in 1997 when InnerChange Freedom Initiative ("InnerChange"),
an evangelical Christian organization, opened a privately run
faith-based unit in a Texas prison.5 Government officials, desperate for a solution to years of high recidivism rates, subsequently gave InnerChange control over prison units in four
states.6 This delegation of control raises constitutional questions
under the Establishment Clause, which provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." '

t B.A. 2003, Clark University; J.D. Candidate 2006, University of Chicago.
' Floida's Governor Bush Dedicates the Nation's First Faith-Based Prison,
CNN.com (Dec 25, 2003), available at <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/South/12/25/faith.
based.jail.ap/> (last visited July 29, 2005).
2 Florida Department of Corrections, Lawtey Correctional Institution, MyFlorida.Com (Aug 16, 2005), available at <http'/www.dc.state.fl.us/facilities/region2/
255.html> (last visited Aug 16, 2005).
' Carolyn Nichols, Nation's First Faith-BasedPison Opens in Florida,Fla Baptist
Witness 1 (Jan 22, 2004), available at <http://www.floridabaptistwitness.com/2031.
article> (last visited July 29, 2005).
4 Joni B. Hannagan, Gov. Bush Announces First Women 's Faith-BasedPrison, (Apr
29, 2004), available at <http.www.floridabaptistwitness.com/2508article> (last visited
May 1, 2005).
' Prison Fellowship Newsroom, The InnerChange Freedom Initiative Fact Sheet,
(Aug 20, 2004), available at <http'J/www.demossnewspond.com/pf/presskitififact
sheet.htm> (last visited July 29, 2005).
6 Id.
7 US Const Amend I.
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Courts use several tests to evaluate Establishment Clause
challenges,' and each test may assist a court in determining if a
particular faith-based prison program is constitutional. This
Comment argues that courts should, at a minimum, evaluate
Establishment Clause challenges to faith-based prisons and
prison units using a coercion test. While violation of a coercion
test is not necessary to find that a program contravenes the Establishment Clause, it is sufficient. The coercion analysis should
focus on the pressures the program puts on prisoners to engage
in religious exercise, including benefits that attend participation
in the program, to determine if the program impermissibly persuades prisoners to participate in religion.
To provide a frame of reference, Part I describes the InnerChange program and also explains why prisoners want to reside
in InnerChange prison units.9 Part II provides background on the
various tests courts use to evaluate Establishment Clause
claims. Subsection A analyzes prisoners' ability to challenge
prison actions and policies as unconstitutional, and argues that
the deferential standard established in Turner v Safle. 0° for
evaluating prisoners' constitutional claims should not apply to
Establishment Clause challenges to faith-based prison programs.
Subsections B through D explain the Supreme Court's major Establishment Clause tests: Agostini-Lemon, endorsement, and
coercion. Subsection E explains how these tests were modified by
the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v Simmons-Harris."

Part III evaluates the constitutionality of faith-based prisons and
prison units by applying the Zelman-modified coercion test, arguing that this test gets to the heart of the appropriate boundary
between church and state in the context of faith-based prisons
and prison units.

s See Part II.
9 Readers should be aware that all faith-based prisons and prison units are not the
same; indeed, even InnerChange units in different states have slightly different policies,
rules and methods. Additionally, state rules pertaining to corrections facilities sometimes
require InnerChange to modify its program. See Email from Norm Cox, Vice President for
Ministry Delivery, InnerChange Freedom Initiative (May 10, 2005) (on file with U Chi
Legal F).
'0 482 US 78 (1987).
" 536 US 639 (2002).
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I. BACKGROUND ON INNERCHANGE FREEDOM INITIATIVE PRISON
UNITS

A.

Brief History of InnerChange Freedom Initiative

In 1997, with the support of then-Governor George W. Bush,
InnerChange Freedom Initiative ("InnerChange"), a project of
Prison Fellowship Ministries, opened a faith-based prison unit at
Jester II, a minimum-security prison in Richmond, Texas. 2 InnerChange is a "Christ-centered, Bible-based prison program
supporting prison inmates through their spiritual and moral
transformation beginning while incarcerated and continuing after release." 3 InnerChange established a voluntary program
where prisoners live in a separate, faith-based unit that immerses them in faith-based teaching, work and basic educational
study for sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, for up to eighteen months. 4 Participation in InnerChange does not end with
the prisoner's release: participants receive a Christian mentor
and church support for a minimum of six months following their
release. 5 There are 995 active participants in the InnerChange
program and approximately 600 volunteers. 6
To be eligible to participate in the program, applicants must
meet a variety of eligibility criteria. For example, in the Texas
InnerChange unit, prisoners must have 18 to 24 months remaining on their sentences and must have no "disqualifying incidents"
on their disciplinary record. 7 In Texas, prisoners with certain
convictions, including sex-offenses and capital murder, are not
permitted to participate."
The InnerChange program is decidedly Christian. 9 Inmates
must sign an agreement stating that they understand the pro12

Id.

InnerChange Freedom Initiative, About - IFIProgram,available at <http'J/www.ifi
prison.org/channelroot/home/aboutprogram.htm> (last visited July 26, 2005).
13

14

Id.

15

See Email from Norm Cox (cited in note 9).

16

Id.

Daniel Brook, When God Goes to Prson,Legal Affairs 22, 25 (May/June 2003). See
also Email from Norm Cox (cited in note 9).
18 Brook, When God Goes to Prison, Legal Affairs at 25 (cited in note 17). Norm Cox
explains that states have different rules on what offenses will disqualify an inmate from
participating in the InnerChange program: in Texas, the prison in which the InnerChange wing sits is a low-security prison, and thus prisoners with certain crimes are
ineligible to reside in the prison itself. Id.
19 See InnerChange, About - 1FIProgram(cited in note 13) (noting that InnerChange
is "[ainchored in biblical teaching that stresses personal responsibility, the value of edu17
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gram is based upon Christian values and principles.2 ° InnerChange states that it does not discriminate on the basis of inmates' religious beliefs, but it does select participants on their
sincere commitment to participate in a rigorous, Christian program.2 1 According to Norm Cox, Vice President for Ministry Delivery for InnerChange, inmates are not evaluated on their beliefs, but are evaluated on how their actions comply with "fruits
of the Spirit": love, joy, peace, kindness, goodness, faithfulness,
gentleness and self-control.22
Once an inmate has been accepted into the program, he23 is
immersed in biblically-based teaching. Inmates take classes on
the basics of Christian faith, the impact of crime on victims and
their families, self esteem, and other subjects.2 4 The program's
volunteers are free to preach and teach as they see fit.25 In addition to religious teaching, InnerChange participants are able to
take classes that assist them in finding a career when they are
released, including GED classes and computer technician training classes, in conditions more favorable than non-InnerChange
units.2 6
B.

Benefits of Residence in InnerChange Prison Units

Although some prisoners seek placement in InnerChange
prison units for religious reasons, many do not.2 There are four
major benefits that can be associated with residing in an InnerChange prison unit: greater ability for inmates to practice religion, enhanced safety, augmented probability of parole, and other
miscellaneous improvements to inmates' quality of life.
cation and work, care of persons and property and the reality of a new life in Chist")
(emphasis added).
20 Email from Norm Cox (cited in note 9).
21

Id.

22 Id. But see First Amended Complaint, Americans Unitedfor SeparationofChurch
and State v Prison Fellowship Ministries,No 4:03-cv-90074 (S D Iowa filed July 2004), T
47, available at <http'//www.au.org/site/DocServer/InnerChangeBrief.pdf?docID=163>
(last visited July 27, 2005). In current litigation, Americans United for the Separation of
Church and State allege that prisoners are evaluated for religious beliefs, including
whether or not they demonstrate a belief in Jesus Christ, pray "in the spirit," and put
God first in their lives. Id.
23 As of publication, InnerChange only operates in male correctional facilities. See
InnerChange, About IFI-Program(cited in note 13).

Brook, When God Goes to Prison,Legal Affairs at 25 (cited in note 17).
Id at 25-26. For example, one volunteer stated, "For those of you who are Muslim,
Jesus is God... I'm sorry if I've offended you, but Jesus is God.'" Id.
26 Id at 27.
27 Id at 28 ("Many of the inmates I spoke with did seem to have joined InnerChange
more out of dissatisfaction with the Texas prison system than out of faith.").
24
25
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One obvious benefit to InnerChange participants is the ease
with which they are able to practice their religion. Christian participants in InnerChange prison units are better able to practice
and explore their faith than they would be in traditional prison
units. Officials and volunteers in some InnerChange units are
required to sign a "statement of faith," a statement that sets
forth the organization's core Christian beliefs.2" Additionally inmates have access to these officials; other individuals' expertise
in Christian teachings and belief; and Bibles, classes, speeches,
concerts and church services unavailable to the general population.29 For Christians, participation in the InnerChange program
provides access to religious instruction unparalleled in the prison
system. 0
Non-Christian inmates sometimes enter InnerChange prison
units out of a "general interest in religion" or a hope that they
might be able to practice their religion in a more open environment than they would be able to in a traditional prison unit.3
Muslim inmates in an InnerChange prison in Texas are allowed
to pray together five times a day32 while there could be different
rules for general population prisoners. Although conditions in
the InnerChange unit may not be perfect, these units are an improvement over the prisons from which these inmates transfer,
prisons where prisoners' constitutional free exercise rights can
28 Email from Norm Cox (cited in note 9).
29 Samantha M. Shapiro, Jails for Jesus: President Bush Wants Faith-BasedPrograms to Take Over Social Services. But What Happens When EvangelicalChristiansTry
TheirHandatRunningPrisons 28 Mother Jones 56-59 (2003).
30 See Ben Paynter, Jesus is in the Big House: PuttingIts Faith in a PrisonMinistry,
the Kansas Departmentof CorrectionsSaves Money If Not Souls, Pitch Weekly (Feb 12,
2004) (detailing the case of one inmate who recognized his decision to join the InnerChange program as easy given that he had "found God" earlier in life).
31 Brook, When God Goes to Prison, Legal Affairs at 27 (cited in note 17). Brook
notes:
The Muslim inmates I spoke with in the Vance Unit told me that they applied to InnerChange out of a general interest in religion but have no intention of converting.
Though there is clearly peer pressure to "find Jesus"-inmates demonstrate their
progress by briefing classmates and staff on their "walk with Christ"-prisoners of
all faiths are allowed to practice their religion in the unit. The twelve Muslim inmates now at the Vance Unit pray five times a day on their own and hold prayer
meetings every Friday.
Id.
Id.
33 See O'Lone vEstate ofShabazz, 482 US 342 (1987) (upholding a New Jersey prison
policy preventing Muslim inmates from attending Friday afternoon religious services on
the ground that the policy was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest).
32
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be-and are-abridged if administrators have a legitimate penological interest.3 4
Prisoners in InnerChange units also have greater access to
certain material, non-religious benefits than do their counterparts in the general prison population. For example, prisoners in
InnerChange units have better access to education than those in
the general population.3 5 In addition to religious instruction, inmates are given the opportunity to get their GED, computer
technician certificates, and other types of job training.3 6 Prisoners are also given access to substance-abuse classes, selfimprovement programs, and parenting courses.37 InnerChange
inmates eat better food, sometimes from outside vendors, and
receive pizza-party orientation ceremonies.3" These inmates have
access to musical instruments, computers, email, art supplies,
and large screen televisions.39 In short, life is much better in the
religious InnerChange wing of a prison than it is elsewhere in a
particular facility.4 °

34 Id (applying the Turner test to uphold a prison policy restricting prisoners' free
exercise rights).
35 See Shapiro, 28 Mother Jones at 58 (cited in note 29) (noting that in a time of
"budgetary woes" for American prisons, InnerChange provides its inmates with free computer training, while members of the prison's general population must pay $150 for similar computer classes).
36 Brook, When God Goes to Prison,Legal Affairs at 27 (cited in note 17).
31 Ark. Board OKs Faith-Based Viginia Program,AP Alert - Va (Mar 1, 2005).
38 Paynter, Jesus is in the Big House (cited in note 30) ("[Ulnlike in regular housing
units, the men of InnerChange have a Christmas banquet to which they can invite their
families. After each new class orientation, directors throw a party for everyone, catered
by Pizza Hut.").
39 Id. See also Brook, When God Goes to Prjson, Legal Affairs at 25-27 (cited in note
17) (detailing the material benefits associated with InnerChange prison facilities);
Paynter, Jesusis in the Big House, Pitch Weekly (same).
40 In current litigation, Americans United for Separation of Church and State alleges
that there are even more significant perks. The allegations include the following: First,
that prisoners in InnerChange prison units are allowed more control over interpersonal
contact, the ability to make free telephone calls to family members, attend religious services with family members, and see visitors more frequently and afforded a higher degree
of privacy than prisoners in conventional prison units are. First Amended Complaint,
Americans Unitedfor Separationof Church and State v PrisonFellowshipMinistriesat
51 (cited in note 22). Second, prisoners in InnerChange's Iowa prison unit have access to
private bathroom stalls, complete with partitions and locking doors, while prisoners in
the other wings of the same prison can only use toilet stalls located in the middle of their
cells. Id at 49. The Iowa InnerChange prison unit features air-conditioning and carpeting, luxuries found nowhere else in that prison. Id. Third, overcrowding is not a problem
in the InnerChange wing: prisoners there are more likely to be housed two to a cell than
those in other wings. Id at 50b. Finally, prisoners in the InnerChange wing are given
keys to their cells, and are free to leave their cells at night while other prisoners are
locked up. Id at 1 49.
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The benefits of residence in an InnerChange unit are not
limited to material benefits like food and recreation. These units
might offer prisoners a safer environment than a secular prison
facility. Prisoners and guards believe that InnerChange prison
units are likely to be safer than the secular alternatives. 41 In the
InnerChange wing of a Texas prison, inmates note a huge difference between the different prison wings: the InnerChange wing
lacks the strained race relations and gang-style prison turf-wars
common to the rest of the prison.42 In Texas prisons, there are
over 600 serious inmate-on-inmate assaults a year, but in the
InnerChange wing of a Texas prison, there are fewer assaults.43
There are many possible explanations for such enhanced
safety: the religious instruction could be more effective at making prisoners less violent;44 the InnerChange units could be safer
because there are physical barriers that prevent entry of those
most likely to commit acts of violence while behind bars;45 the
units could be safer because prisoners with disciplinary records
are not permitted to participate;46 or it might be that it is hard
for prisoners to cause trouble in the InnerChange units because
of their low guard-to-inmate ratios. 47 Perhaps due to a combination of all of these factors, InnerChange prison units appear safer
than their secular counterparts.
Participation in the InnerChange program could also materially alter a prisoner's chances of being paroled. For some parole
boards, participation in an InnerChange program sends a clear
signal that the inmate deserves parole. As one InnerChange
41

Ron Word, Chist Behind Bars; Nation's First Faith-BasedPrisonsHoping to Re-

duce Recidivism, Telegraph Herald D1 (May 22, 2004) ("Inmates and corrections officers
alike agree that the atmosphere at [Florida's faith-based prison] is safer for both sides.").
See Paynter, Jesus in the Bi House, Pitch Weekly (cited in note 20) (noting that a Kansas InnerChange prison wing is safer than where the general population is housed given
that there is a higher prisoner-to-guard ration in the former and that "[i]n Texas, some
inmates have told reporters that they have used the program merely to get away from the
violence and racial tension in the general population"). See also Email from Norm Cox
(cited in note 9) (When asked to explain the difference in safety between InnerChange
prison units and regular prisons, Norm Cox called the InnerChange units "peaceful and
safe.").
42 Brook, When God Goes to Prison,Legal Affairs at 28 (cited in note 17) (noting that
unlike most Texas prison units, in an InnerChange unit it is "more common to find prisoners crying than fighting-not because of any physical or emotional distress, but because they have been moved by the religious programs").
43 Id.
44 Lynn S. Branham, "Go and Sin No More:" The Constitutionalityof Government
FundedFaith-BasedPrison Units, 37 U Mich J L Ref 291, 330 (2004).
" Brook, When God Goes to Prison,Legal Affairs at 28 (cited in note 17).
46

Id.

4' Paynter, Jesus is in the Big House,Pitch Weekly (cited in note 30).
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prison official stated, "We have a very positive relationship with
4
the board. Sometimes they just give our inmates a green light."
But even in situations where parole is not automatic, participation in the program has clear benefits. For example, in Kansas,
InnerChange prescreens its candidates with the parole board to
learn what each inmate needs to do in order to be released. The
prescreening is successful: as of February 2005, no Kansas InnerChange inmate had been denied parole.4 9
The increase in the likelihood of being granted parole may
be due to several factors. Parole might be given more frequently
because those in faith-based prisons are more likely to have been
model prisoners behind bars: prisoners cannot get into many InnerChange units if they have had any disciplinary infractions or
if they have committed certain heinous crimes.5 ° Parole might be
granted because InnerChange programs allow inmates to complete treatment and educational programs more quickly than
their counterparts in the general population.5 1 Parole might also
be granted in a disparate manner because InnerChange prison
programs are more effective at rehabilitating prisoners than
other programs available to prisoners.52
Although there are difficult factual questions as to the actual benefits attendant to participation in an InnerChange
prison unit or any other religious prison unit,53 there is the pos48 Shapiro, 28 Mother Jones at 56 (cited in note 29).
49 Paynter, JesusIs in the BigHouse, Pitch Weekly (cited in note 30).
50 Brook, When God Goes to Prison,Legal Affairs at 25 (cited in note 17).
51 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Separate Statement in
Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Americans Unitedfor Separationof
Church and State v Prison FellowshipMinistries,No 4:03-cv-90074,
641-49 (S D Iowa
filed July 2004) (on file with U Chi Legal F).
52 This claim is hotly disputed. A study released by the University of Pennsylvania's
Center for Research on Religion and Urban Civil Society ("CRRUCS") found that "graduates" of the Texas InnerChange program were 50% less likely to be rearrested and 60%
less likely to be reincarcerated than the matched comparison group. Byron R. Johnson
and David B. Larson, The InnerChangeFreedom Initiative:A PreliminaryEvaluationof
a Faith-Based Prison Program 5 (CRRUCS 2003). For the purposes of the study, a
'graduate" is an inmate who completed the in-prison portion of the InnerChange program
and continues to fulfill certain InnerChange requirements, including meeting with a
mentor, holding a steady job and becoming active in a local church. Id. Rearrest and reincarceration rates are much less promising for those who do not graduate: those who participate in the InnerChange program without graduating had slightly worse recidivism
rates than the state average. Id. For a criticism of this study, see Mark A. R. Kleiman,
Faith-BasedFudging How a Bush-promoted Christianprison program fakes success by
massagingdata, Slate, Aug 5, 2003, available at <http://slate.msn.com/id/2086617/> (last
visited July 29, 2005) (arguing that the CRRUCS study fails to minimize selection bias,
rendering its conclusions highly suspect).
53 Notably, the litigation of Americans United for Separation of Church and State v
Prison Fellowship Ministries, No 4:03-cv-90074 (S D Iowa July 2004), may provide an-
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sibility that the differences between residence in a secular or sectarian facility will rise to the level of an Establishment Clause
violation. This Comment now summarizes the tests used to
evaluate such cases.

II. TESTS USED TO EVALUATE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CLAIMS
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."5 4 The Supreme Court has established many
different tests for evaluating whether the state 5 has effected an
unconstitutional establishment of religion, and there are three
tests that have garnered majority support in evaluating Establishment Clause claims: the Agostini-Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test. All three tests are used by
courts today.56
Before a court can evaluate faith-based prison units using
these Establishment Clause tests, it must first determine if the
same standards apply to prisoners' Establishment Clause challenges. Some argue that a more deferential test, the modified
rational-basis test delineated in Turner v Safley,57 should be used
to evaluate prisoners' Establishment Clause claims.58 But while
prisoners do not enjoy the same level of constitutional protections as the unincarcerated, Turner should not be used to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges to faith-based prisons and
prison units. Subsection A explains why Turner should be not be
used to evaluate challenges to faith-based prisons and prison
units, Subsections B through D briefly summarize the tests used
to evaluate Establishment Clause cases, and Subsection E explains how the Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v SimmonsHarris modified the three dominant modes of Establishment
Clause analysis.

swers to some of these questions in the near future.
US Const Amend I.
'5 "State" refers to either the federal government or any of the several states. The
Supreme Court has used the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Establishment
Clause against the states. Everson v Board of Education, 330 US 1, 15-16 (1947). This
incorporation is not without criticism: see, for example, Note, Rethinking the Incorporation ofthe EstablishmentClause:A Federalist View, 105 Harv L Rev 1700 (1992).
56 Newdow v UnitedStates Congress,292 F3d 597, 605 (9th Cir 2002).
57 482 US 78 (1987).
"5 See Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref 291 (cited in note 44) (evaluating the constitutionality of faith-based prison units under Turner).
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Turner v Safley

Prisoners do not enjoy the same constitutional rights as the
59 the Supreme Court established a
unincarcerated. In Turner,
four-part modified rational basis test for evaluating claims that
prison policies or practices violate prisoners' Constitutional
rights."0 It is unclear whether or not the test enunciated in
Turner applies to prisoners' Establishment Clause claims.6 1 But
arguments in favor of using Turner to analyze prisoners' Establishment Clause challenges rely exclusively on the holding in
that case and ignore the rationale behind it. In short, Turner
should not apply to Establishment Clause challenges.
In Turner, prisoners in the Missouri Division of Corrections
challenged two prison regulations: the first restricted correspondence between inmates and the second restricted an inmate's
right to marry.2 A five-member majority held that the restriction
on inmate correspondence was a constitutional limitation on the
First Amendment and all nine justices agreed that the marriage
restriction violated prisoners' Fourteenth Amendment rights.'
The Court upheld the policy that allowed inmate-to-inmate correspondence when the inmates were related to one another or
when the correspondence was related to legal matters.' Other
correspondence was allowed only when it was in the "best interests of the parties involved," a rule that, in practice, forbade nonrelative inmates from corresponding with each other.6 5 The
Court's holding was buttressed by four prior cases that upheld
prison policies restricting prisoners' individual rights where the
accommodation of those rights threatened prison safety.66 Noting
that inmate-to-inmate correspondence is often used in ways that
threaten safety, namely to organize gangs and other criminal
9 482 US 78 (1987).
60 Id at 89.

6' Compare Williams v Lara, 52 SW3d 171, 188 n 10 (Tex 2001) (holding Turner
inapplicable to prisoners' Establishment Clause claims) with Boyd v Coughlin, 914 F
Supp 828, 832 (N D NY 1996) (applying Turner when a prison regulation failed the
Lemon test).
62 Turner,482 US at 81-82.
63

Id.

' Id at 82.
65 Id.

66 Pell v Procunier,417 US 817 (1974) (denying inmate's challenge to prison policy
prohibiting face-to-face media interviews); Jones v North CarolinaPrisoners'Union, 433
US 119 (1977) (upholding prohibition of meetings of a prisoners' labor union); Bell v Wolfish, 441 US 520 (1979) (upholding prison policy only allowing prisoners to receive hardback books directly from publishers, book clubs, or bookstores); Block v Rutherford,468
US 576 (1984) (upholding prison policy banning contact visits).
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enterprises, the Court stressed the need to defer to prison administrators on issues of safety
and other "intractable problems of
67
prison administration."

Synthesizing the holdings in prior prisoners'-rights cases,
the Court established a four-part test to determine if prison regulations that restrict prisoners' constitutional rights are unconstitutional. First, a threshold requirement for constitutionality is
that the policy must have a valid, rational connection to the legitimate government interest put forward to justify it.6" If this
requirement is satisfied, then courts must balance three remaining factors: other ways for inmates to exercise the right in question; alternative means of achieving the legitimate penological
objectives furthered by the restrictive prison policy; and how accommodating the inmates' rights will affect correctional officers,
other inmates, and institutional resources.69
In a later case, the Court noted that it "made quite clear that
the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration implicate Constitutional rights."7" The Turner test has been used to
uphold prison regulations that restrict prisoners' free speech,
marriage, association, free exercise of religion, due process, and
court access rights.7 ' But while the Court has used broad strokes
in defining its deference to prison officials on issues of prison
administration, not all courts have used-or even mentionedthe Turner test when evaluating prisoners' Establishment
Clause claims.72 Reliance on Turnerfor the proposition that pris67 Turner,482 US at 89-91.
68 Id at 89.
69

Id at 89-91.

70 Washington vHarper,494 US 210, 224 (1990).

7' Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref at 303 (cited in note 44) (citations omitted).
72 See Williams, 52 SW3d at 188 (declining to apply Turner to an Establishment
Clause challenge); Kerr vFarrey,95 F3d 472, 476-80 (7th Cir 1996) (analyzing an Establishment Clause claim without applying Turner); Muhammad v City of NY Dept of Corrections, 904 F Supp 161, 195-99 (S D NY 1995) (applying Turner to free-exercise and
equal-protection claims but not to an Establishment Clause claim), appeal dismissed, 126
F3d 119 (2d Cir 1997); Scarpino v Grossiem, 852 F Supp 798, 804 (S D Iowa 1994) (explicitly stating that Turner does not apply to an Establishment Clause claim); Card v
Dugger, 709 F Supp 1098, 1103-10 (M D Fla 1988) (applying Turner to a free-exercise
claim but not to an Establishment Clause claim), affd, 871 F2d 1023 (11th Cir 1989). See
also Derek Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitaton:The Requisition of God by the
State, 47 Duke L J 785, 822-36 (1998) (arguing that applying Turner to Establishment
Clause claims can have a devastating effect). But see Boyd, 914 F Supp at 832 (stating
that courts should first evaluate prisoners' Establishment Clause claims on the basis of
the Lemon test, and if the policy at issue violates Lemon, courts should then ask if the
program is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests); Warburton v Underwood, 2 F Supp 2d 306, 316 (W D NY 1998) (finding that prisoners' Establishment Clause
challenges are "tempered" by Turner,but applying Establishment Clause tests anyway);
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oners' Establishment Clause claims should be reviewed under
rational-basis style balancing is misplaced because the concerns
underlying Turner are not necessarily implicated in the Establishment Clause context.
The Turner majority was worried that subjecting prison administrators' decisions to strict scrutiny would require courts to
decide how best to deal with the difficult problems inherent in
prison administration.73 While prisoners do not leave their constitutional rights at the gate of the prison, it would be extremely
costly to guarantee individuals the same constitutional protections behind bars as they receive in front of them. Courts are justifiably reluctant to become "super legislatures," and the Turner
Court recognized that courts are even more reluctant to become
"super wardens" who determine whether particular prison administration decisions are acceptable.74 The majority noted, "Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability
to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions
to the intractable problems of prison administration." 5
The worry is that prison administrators and courts will be
required to grant exemptions from many prison rules because of
a conflict with a constitutional right, like the free speech claim
argued in Turner, and the free exercise concern at issue in
O'one v Estate of Shabbaz,76 a decision handed down the same
day as Turner. The government would be greatly burdened by
granting exemptions from prison policies to individual prisoners,
particularly with respect to claims that prison policies violate
free speech and free exercise rights.7
But this concern is not implicated by prisoners' claims that
InnerChange prison units violate the Establishment Clause.
Those who challenge such programs on Establishment Clause
grounds do not generally seek review of "day-to-day judgments of
prison officials"; they want a court to determine if a state's delegation of prison authority to a private, religious group impermisBranham, 37 U Mich J L Ref 291 (cited in note 44) (arguing that Turner or a Turner
hybrid should be used to evaluate prisoners' Establishment Clause claims).
13 482 US at 89.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 482 US 342 (1987) (upholding, in the face of a free exercise challenge, a New Jersey prison regulation that prevented Muslim inmates from attending Jumu'ah, a weekly
Muslim congregational service).
77 See Apanovitch, 47 Duke L J at 832-33 ("If the government has to consider individuals' religious beliefs before acting, the potential reach of the Establishment Clause
would paralyze government's ability to function.") (cited in note 72).
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sibly establishes religion. There is no claim that the government
needs to accommodate a particular individual and his beliefs; it
is a question of whether or not a broad policy granting power to a
private, religious organization contravenes the Establishment
Clause. For this reason, most courts have rightly held that the
Turner test is inapplicable to Establishment Clause challenges
and other challenges that do not involve individual accommodations.7"
Further, applying the Turner test to prisoners' Establishment Clause challenges could lead to results "discomfiting and at
odds with the overarching purpose of both religion clauses."7 9 If
Turner is taken at face value, it could authorize government
pressure on inmates to accept placement in a religious unit, up to
and including compelled placement in such a unit. 0 This raises a
host of constitutional problems and, in particular, could create
massive tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses. For this reason, courts should be wary of applying the
Turnertest to Establishment Clause challenges.
Finally, the Supreme Court no longer applies Turner without exception to prisoners' constitutional challenges. In Johnson
v California,"'the Court recently abandoned the Turner test in
cases related to the constitutional prohibition against racial discrimination, apparently discarding the belief that it is "quite
clear that the standard of review we adopted in Turner applies to
all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration
implicate Constitutional rights." 2 In Johnson, the Supreme
Court struck down an unwritten California policy that segregated inmates on the basis of race immediately following place" See Scarpino, 852 F Supp 798, 804-05 (holding that Establishment Clause claims
do not concern accommodation, and thus Turner is inapplicable). See also Williams, 52
SW3d at 188-89 (generally applicable Establishment Clause jurisprudence should govern
prisoners' Establishment Clause claims). Consider Jordan v Gardner,986 F2d 1521, 1530
(9th Cir 1993) (holding that the Turner test should not be used to evaluate Eighth
Amendment claims because such claims do not necessarily concern an accommodation of
an individual prisoner). Notably, several courts have analyzed prisoners' Establishment
Clause challenges without even mentioning Turner. See Kerr,95 F3d at 476-80 (analyzing prisoner's Establishment Clause challenge to Narcotics Anonymous program without
mentioning four-part Turner test); Muhammad, 904 F Supp at 195-99 (applying Turner
to free-exercise and equal-protection claims, but not to Establishment Clause claims).
79 Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref at 321 (cited in note 44).
o This pressure is most likely to increase when there is some evidence that such
units reduce recidivism or otherwise help the government achieve a legitimate penological objective. See id at 321-22 (discussing the likelihood of the government forcing prisoners to live in faith-based units given the ostensible relationship between units and the
furthering of legitimate government interests, such as a reduction in recidivism rates).
81 125 S Ct 1141 (2005).
82 Washington vHarper,494 US 210, 224 (1990).
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ment or transfer to a new prison facility, even though prison administrators justified this rule on the basis of promoting prison
safety." The majority held that Turner only applied when evaluating claims for rights that are "inconsistent with proper incarceration," without defining the contours of this new term of art.
In dissent, Justice Thomas noted that the Court had "eviscerated" the Turnertest.'
In conclusion, the rationale that undergirds Turner is inapplicable to prisoners' Establishment Clause challenges. Using the
Turner test would lead to results discomforting to most: the allowance, under some circumstances, of the forced religious indoctrination of prisoners, so long as such indoctrination was reasonably related to a legitimate penological goal. It is clear that
the Supreme Court is not as attached to the Turner standard as
it once was, as the Court has shown a willingness to secondguess the decisions of prison officials, even when those decisions
are designed to promote safety. As such, courts should not use
the Turnertest in evaluating prisoners' challenges to faith-based
prisons and prison units. The question then is which of the generally applicable Establishment Clause tests should be used to
evaluate prisoners' claims.
B.

The Agostini-Lemon Test

The Agostini-Lemon test is a modification of the Lemon test,
a three-pronged test established in Lemon v Kurtzman. 5 The
Lemon test has been called the "test applied most frequently" in
evaluating Establishment Clause disputes, 6 the "dominant mode
of Establishment Clause analysis,"" and the "primary organizing
principle of Establishment Clause decisions."88 In short, nearly
all Establishment Clause analysis begins with Lemon. 9
8' In Johnson,the Court noted that the prison rationalized its practice on the ground
"that it is necessary to prevent violence caused by racial gangs." 125 S Ct at 1144-45.
("An associate warden testified that if race were not considered in making initial housing
assignments, she is certain there would be racial conflict in the cells and in the yard ....
Other prison officials also expressed their belief that violence and conflict would result if
prisoners were not segregated.") (citations omitted).
' Id at 1167-78 (Thomas and Scalia, dissenting).
85 403 US 602 (1971).
86 Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref at 301 (cited in note 44).
87 Trent Collier, Note, Revenue Bonds and Reh'gious Education: The Constitutionality of Conduit FinancingInvolving Pervasively Sectarian Institutions, 100 Mich L Rev
1108, 1109-10 (2002).
88 Steven G. Gey, "Under God," The Pledge ofAllegiance, and Other Constitutional
Triia,81 NC L Rev 1865, 1885 (2004).
89 Calvin R. Massey, Pure Symbols and the FirstAmendment, 17 Hastings Const L Q
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In Lemon, the Supreme Court found Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes that provided state aid to parochial elementary schools unconstitutional.9 ° The Court stated that it had
previously used three tests to determine if a state action violates
the Establishment Clause: (1) does the state action have a secular legislative purpose, (2) is the state action's principal or primary effect one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and
(3) does the state action not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.9 Each of these past tests constitutes a
separate prong of the Lemon test.9 2 A state action is only consti-

tutional if the court answers each of the respective prongs in the
affirmative.
The Court modified this test in Agostini v Felton.93 The
Court formally noted the overlap between the second and third
prongs of the Lemon test,94 and tried to fix problems in Lemods
operation. The primary problem was that the Lemon test could
require extensive monitoring of a program to ensure there was
no impermissible religious inculcation, but that such monitoring
rendered many programs unconstitutional because it constituted
excessive entanglement.95 The Court noted that the central hold369, 378 (1990) ("Modern establishment clause jurisprudence begins with Lemon v.
Kurtzman and unravels shortly thereafter.") (citation omitted). But see Jesse Choper, The
Endorsement Test: Its Status and Desirability, 18 J L & Pol 499, 499-501 (2002) (noting
extensive criticism of the Lemon test).
90 403 US at 603.
91 Lemon, 403 US at 612-13, citing Board of Education v Allen, 392 US 236, 243
(1968); Waltz v Tax Commission, 397 US 664, 668 (1970) (internal quotations omitted).
92 Id.

93 521 US 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar vFelton, 473 US 402 (1985), a prior decision
that held the Establishment Clause barred New York City from sending public school
teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial education to disadvantaged children).
94 Id at 233. Consider Elbert Lin, et al, Faith in the Courts? The Legal and Political
Future of Federally-FundedFaith-BasedInitiatives, 20 Yale L & Pol Rev 183, 201-02
(2002).
95 See Jeremy T. Bunnow, Note, Reinventing the Lemon: Agostini v. Felton and the
Changing Nature of Establishment Clause Jursprudence,1998 Wis L Rev 1133, 1174.
Bunnow explains,
As long as a public employee placed on parochial school grounds is presumed to inculcate religion or the school itself is presumed to use the government funds to advance religion, the program must include an extensive and intrusive system
whereby the government is able to monitor the employee or the school's activity.
However, because such a pervasive monitoring program would inevitably result in
an excessive entanglement between church and state, an insurmountable roadblock
to this type of government aid existed. This "Catch-22" was explicitly criticized by
Chief Justice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O'Connor in their respective
Aguilardissents.
Id (citations omitted). For an example of how the "Catch-22" operated, see Robert L. Kil-
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ing of Lemon was that no program should "further or inhibit"
religion, and that using the "excessive entanglement" prong to
strike down all religious programs was unnecessary.9 6 The Court
added standards to assist courts in defining "furthering" and "inhibiting" as to prevent other courts from reading the modified
Lemon test as broadly as Lemon itself.97 Although the Court was
not very explicit in Agostini that it was significantly altering the
Lemon test, Justice O'Connor later stated that Agostini "folded
the entanglement inquiry into the primary effect inquiry."'
C.

The Endorsement Test

A second major mechanism for analyzing Establishment
Clause claims is the endorsement test, first enunciated by Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion in Lynch v Donnelly.99 The
endorsement test is used to evaluate Establishment Clause challenges to private group action that could be construed as government action supporting religion.10 0 In Lynch, the Court held
that a city-owned and operated holiday display including a decorative Santa, reindeer, teddy bears, and a nativity creche did not
violate the Establishment Clause.'0 ' The Court, emphasizing its
"unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area," °2 found that the holiday display did not violate the Constitution because it was no more objectionable than
other situations the Court had previously upheld against Establishment Clause challenges.01 3
Justice O'Connor attempted to clarify this area of the law by
replacing the Lemon test with two separate tests that she felt

roy, Note, A Lost Opportunity to Sweeten the Lemon of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: An Analysis ofRosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 6
Cornell J L & Pub Pol 701, 707-08 (1997).
96 Bunnow, 1998 Wis L Rev at 1174-75 (cited in note 95).
97

Id.
Zelman v Simmons-Harmis, 536 US 639, 668-69 (2002) (O'Connor concurring)
(citing Agostini,521 US at 218, 232-33).
99 465 US 668 (1984).
100 Elizabeth D. Kaiser, Jesus Heard the Word of God, but Mohammed had Convulsions: How Religion Clause Principlesshould be Applied to Religion in the Public School
Social Studies Curriculum,34 J L & Educ 321, 331 (2003).
1o1 465 US 668 (1984).
98

102

Id at 679.

103

Id at 682, citing Board of Education v Allen, 392 US 236 (1968) (upholding the

expenditure of large sums of public money for textbooks given to students at churchsponsored schools); McGowan vMaryland,366 US 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday Closing
Laws); Marsh v Chambers,463 US 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayers).
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better addressed Lemods purpose.114 In O'Connor's view, the two
ways that the government could run afoul of the Establishment
Clause were to become too entangled with religious institutions
or to endorse or disapprove of religion. °5 O'Connor noted that
endorsement:
[S]ends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.1"6
The Court employed the endorsement test when it revisited
the issue of holiday displays in Allegheny County v ACLU

17

At

issue in this case were two holiday displays, one of which the
Court found violated the Establishment Clause.0 8 Noting that
the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence had evolved
since Lemon, a majority of the Court analyzed the issue by paying "particularly close attention to whether the challenged practice has the purpose or effect of endorsing religion."109 The major-

ity cited O'Connor's Lynch concurrence for the proposition that
government action cannot make adherence to religion relevant to
a person's standing in the political community and held this to be
a minimum requirement of the Establishment Clause."0
In evaluating the two holiday displays at issue, the splintered Court used several different tests, from Lemon to endorsement to coercion, and interpreted the tests differently. However,
Allegheny County stands for the vitality of the endorsement test
because a majority of the Court held that it was useful in evaluof
ating Establishment Clause disputes."' In fact, every member 112
the current court has accepted the use of the endorsement test.
While there have been disagreements about how to interpret the
104

Lynch, 465 US at 687 (O'Connor concurring).

105

Id at 687-88.

106

Id.

107

492 US 573 (1989).

108

These displays included a crbche in the central grand staircase at the Allegheny

County courthouse and a forty-five foot tall Christmas tree, an eighteen foot tall Menorah, and a sign that indicated the holiday display was a salute to freedom, all of which
appeared near the City-County building. Id at 579-87.
109 Id at 592.
110 Id at 594.
11 Allegheny County,492 US at 593.
112 Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 Cal L Rev 673, 698 (2002).
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endorsement test and when it should be used,'13 a number of
Justices have used some version of the endorsement test to analyze Establishment Clause claims."'
D.

The Coercion Test

Courts employing the coercion test analyze state action to
determine whether it subtly or directly coerces individuals to
participate in religious activity." 5 If it does, through psychological or other means, the state action violates the Establishment
Clause." 6 The coercion test is most commonly used when evaluating situations in which children might be pressured to engage
in a religious exercise, but the test is not strictly confined to
those situations. The modern coercion test is rooted in Justice
Kennedy's dissent in Allegheny County. 7 However, it was not
applied in a majority opinion until Lee v Weisman."'
In Lee, invocation and benediction prayers at public elementary and secondary school graduation exercises were held to be
an unconstitutional establishment of religion."' Even though
attendance at graduation was nominally voluntary, the Court
found that there were incredible pressures on students to attend
and to act respectfully during the prayers. 2 ' The Court found
113 See, for example, Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v Pinette, 515 US
753 (1995) (finding that the state cannot bar the Ku Klux Klan from erecting a Latin
cross in a plaza next to the state capital because "[religious expression cannot violate the
Establishment Clause where it (1) is purely private and (2) occurs in a traditional or
designated public forum, publicly announced and open to all on equal terms"). In Pinette,
the four Justices felt that the endorsement test should only be applied to government
actions, while three Justices, including Justice O'Connor, believed that the crux of the
issue did not rest on whether the government initiated the action in question, but
whether the reasonable observer would think the government endorsed religion.
114 See, for example, Santa Fe Independent School District v Doe, 530 US 290 (2000)
(citing the endorsement test when striking down a school policy facilitating the election of
a student-led pre-game football prayer).
115 Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577, 588 (1992).
116 The phrase "coercion test" as used in this subsection refers to coercion as defined
by the majority in Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992).
117 492 US at 659 (Kennedy concurring) (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy argued:

Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it may not, in the guise of
avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give direct benefits to religion in such a
degree that it in fact "establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do
so."
Id.
"8 505 US 577, 588 (1992).
119 Id at 586-87.
120 Id at 594-96.
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these coercive pressures forced students to participate or appear
exercise in contravention of the Esto participate in a religious
121
Clause.
tablishment
Two separate concurrences, written or joined by the other
four members of the Lee majority, stressed that coercion was sufficient for an Establishment Clause violation, but not necessary. 122 The concurrences asserted that a government practice
coercing participation in religious activity constitutes an Establishment Clause violation, but a finding of no coercion does not
end the inquiry. 23 Instead, once a court has determined a particular practice is non-coercive, the court should merely continue
to analyze the case using the Lemon and endorsement tests. 24
Zelman v Simmons-Harrisand the Modification of the Establishment Clause Tests

E.

In Zelman v Simmons-Haris,125 the Supreme Court upheld
a scholarship program that provided school vouchers to the parents of children in the Cleveland City School District. In so holding, the Court modified, explicitly and implicitly, the three major
modes of Establishment Clause analysis.
In Zelman, the Court evaluated an Ohio scholarship program that provided school vouchers to parents of children in an
extremely distraught school system. The vouchers could be used
at any participating school, public or private, secular or sectarian.12 1 Most participating schools were religious-in the 19992000 school year, 82% of participating schools were sectarianand over 96% of the 3,700 participating students used the vouchers to enroll in religiously affiliated schools. 27
In analyzing this program, the Court used, in various forms,
the three tests discussed above: the Agostini-Lemon test, the endorsement test, and the coercion test. Although it did not rely on
one test exclusively, it used the same rationale to support its
conclusion that the Cleveland program did not violate the Establishment Clause: namely, that any benefit to religion was a result of the "true private choice" of parents and, as such, the bene121

Id at 593.

122

Id at 604 (Blackmun concurring), 618 (Souter concurring).
Lee, 505 US at 604 (Blackmun concurring).
Id at 618 (Souter concurring).
536 US 639 (2002).
Il at 645-47.
Id at 647.

123
124
125
126
127
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fit was a result of individual, not state, action.'28 In so doing, the
Zelman court redefined each of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause tests.'2 9 In effect, the Court stated that a program
satisfies all three tests if any benefit to a religious organization
is the result of "true private choice." 3 '
The major alteration of the coercion test was in the definition of impermissible coercion. Courts using the Lee coercion test
analyze state actions and policies to determine whether the government subtly or directly coerces individuals to participate in
religious activity.' The majority in Lee concluded, "It is beyond
dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that
the government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise. " "' This was not challenged by the dissent: all nine Justices agreed that the Establishment Clause bars
coercion to engage in religious activity. "I The dispute among the
Justices was about the definition of coercion.
The plurality in Zelman refused to use a pure psychological
analysis of coercion, and while it declined to discard the test entirely, it significantly diluted it.' The Court determined that the
presence or absence of coercion must be analyzed by looking at
all options available to the relevant actors.' 3 5 If the choice exercised by the relevant actors was true and private, then there was
no impermissible coercion. 3 '
However, Justice O'Connor's concurrence refused to let the
majority pull all of the coercion test's teeth. Her concurrence defines "true and private choice" more carefully than other members of the Court. Justice O'Connor stated that true and private
choices can only be made when there are genuine options. 3 v A
genuine option exists when there is an "adequate substitute" for
the religious option in the eyes of the relevant actor. 3 ' While
128

Id at 648-58.

129

Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the FirstAmendment: The History,

the Doctrine and the Future,6 U Pa J Const L 222, 263 (2003).
130 Id.
131 Lee, 505 US at 588.
132

Id at 587.

133

Id at 640 (Scalia dissenting); Griffin v Coughlin, 673 NE2d 98, 106 n 6 (NY Ct App

1996).
134
135

Feldman, 6 U Pa J Const L at 263 (cited in note 135).
Zelman, 536 US at 655-56. See also Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md, Inc. v

Montgomery County Pubhlic Schools, 373 F3d 589, 598 (noting explicitly that Zelman
modified the coercion test).
136 Zelman, 536 US at 656-61.
137 Id at 670 (O'Connor concurring).
138 Id. But see Freedom from Religion Foundation,Inc v McCallum, 324 F3d 880, 884
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there is no requirement for objective measures of similar quality,
actors must feel like they have a real choice.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ZELMAN-MODIFIED COERCION TEST
Each faith-based prison program raises many independent
constitutional questions, and can be held violative of the Establishment Clause under different tests for a variety of reasons.139
Courts should carefully evaluate each challenge to faith-based
prison programs using multiple tests; among them is the coercion
test.
There are several ways one can define the coercion test, but
courts should analyze Establishment Clause challenges to faithbased prisons and prison units using the coercion test as implicitly refined by Justice O'Connor's opinion in Zelman. This test
helps assure that the government does not give any person a
great incentive to participate in religious activity.
There are three ways in which faith-based prisons or prison
units may unconstitutionally coerce inmates to participate in
religious exercise: (1) offering inmates a safer environment; (2)
offering participants a better possibility of parole; and (3) offering inmates a much higher quality of life than the available alternatives provide. If inmates lack "genuine choice" among relatively adequate substitutes, courts should hold that the faithbased prison or prison unit violates the Establishment Clause.
A.

The Problem of Increased Safety

Faith-based prisons and prison units appear to be safer than
their secular alternatives."€ This has massive constitutional significance. In a case decided under the extremely deferential
Turner test, the Supreme Court rejected a prisoner's claim that
participation in a sexual offender treatment program forced him
to violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.' Participation in the sexual offender treatment
(7th Cir 2003) (holding that the quality of the religious choice, compared to other options,
should not be considered when applying the Zelman-modified coercion test: "It is a misunderstanding of freedom... to suppose that choice is not free when the objects between
which the chooser must choose are not equally attractive to him.").
139 See, for example, Todd Collins, Lost In The Forestof The Establishment Clause.Elk Grove v. Newdow, 27 Campbell L Rev 1 (2004); Daniel P. Hart, Note, God's Work,
Caesar's Wallet: Solving the Constitutional Conundrum of Government Aid to Faithbased Charities,38 Ga L Rev 1089 (2003).
140 See discussion accompanying notes 41-47.
141 McKune vLile, 536 US 24, 31 (2002).
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program provided inmates with a variety of significant benefits,
but participation required inmates to confess to all crimes, even
those for which the offender had not been convicted, without any
guarantee of immunity. 14 2 The Supreme Court denied the prisoner's claim. A four-Justice plurality believed that the loss of
benefits attendant to not admitting all past crimes did not rise to
the level of a Fifth Amendment violation."' Justice O'Connor
agreed with the majority's rationale with one caveat: if the prisoner's safety was at risk when he chose to incriminate himself,
his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination might be
violated.1" But because the lower court did not enter any specific
that the record refindings on this issue, O'Connor determined
145
claim.
prisoner's
the
of
rejection
quired the
O'Connor's opinion is important because it recognized that
prisoners' safety is an important factor when evaluating the constitutionality of prison regulations. If enhanced safety in a religious alternative could constitute Fifth Amendment compulsion,
even under the highly-deferential Turner standard, such a program would be unconstitutionally coercive in the Establishment
Clause context. In Zelman, O'Connor stated that coercion could
exist if there are no genuine options for the person choosing between a religious program and a non-religious one, defining
genuine option as an "adequate substitute" for the religious option in the eyes of the relevant actor.' 46 It is hard to imagine that
a prisoner would find an unsafe prison an "adequate substitute"
for a safe, religious one.
O'Connor's analysis in McKune and Zelman gets to the heart
of the appropriate relationship between the Establishment
Clause and faith-based prisons. If the faith-based option is substantially better than the secular alternative, prisoners are implicitly encouraged to participate in religious activities to enjoy
greater benefits or privileges. While encouragement is both acceptable and desirable in some contexts, such as giving wellbehaved prisoners certain rewards, it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause when prisoners receive benefits for religious
attitudes or actions. It will not always be easy to determine what
types of benefits are so minimal as to lose significance in an Establishment Clause analysis; all things being equal, a faith-based
142
143
144
141
141

Id at 30-34.
Id at 37-38 (O'Connor concurring).
Id at 51.
McKune, 536 US at 51 (O'Connor concurring).
Zelman, 536 US at 670 (O'Connor concurring).
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program that allows inmates a little more time with family
members or residence in a newer prison wing probably does not
eliminate a true and private choice. But it is not difficult to reason that offering prisoners a substantially better chance of avoiding assault, rape, or murder while behind bars gives them virtually no such choice. 147 While there may not be a constitutionally
significant difference in giving an inmate a choice between vanilla and chocolate ice cream, there is such a difference in offering an inmate the choice between ice cream and antifreeze.
As Fred Becker, Warden of the InnerChange wing of a Texas
prison stated, "If a person is not particularly in favor of religion-is not in favor of doing anything for a criminal offenderbut they're in favor of their own safety, this program is the best
society has had for the 200-plus-year history of
insurance policy
this nation." 141 While Warden Becker was likely speaking about
how society would be safer if prisons could reduce inmate recidivism, he easily could have been speaking directly to prisoners. If
faith-based prisons or prison units are significantly safer than
their secular counterparts, 149 such programs are the best, and
perhaps only, insurance policy these prisoners can get. As such,
prisoners are coerced into engaging in religious exercises in violation of the Establishment Clause.
B.

The Problem of Earlier Parole

If prisoners receive parole benefits for participating in a
faith-based prison or prison unit, there is a serious constitutional
issue. As Professor Lynn Branham notes:
[I]f prisoners faced the prospect of either a shortened or
lengthened term of confinement if housed in the faithbased unit, the discrepant treatment of prisoners would
be an overt indicator of governmental non-neutrality be147 This argument is strong even though courts have generally refused to hold that a
'choice between enhanced safety ... and more expansive freedom and privileges" is not
unconstitutional. Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref at 334 (cited in note 44). The choice between more freedom and more safety offers inmates a true choice. Inmates have no more
freedom from religious establishment if they chose not to enter the faith-based prison or
prison unit: the religious establishment exists either way.
148 Prison Fellowship Newsroom, An Alternative to Traditional Incarceration?The
CorrectionsIndustry Responds to InnerChange Freedom Initiative, DeMoss News Pond,
available at <http://www.demossnewspond.com/pf/presskitifialternatives052203.htm>
(last visited July 29, 2005).
149 See Brook, When God Goes to i'son, Legal Affairs at 28 (cited in note 17) (noting
that InnerChange units seem to be less violent than traditional prison units).
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tween religion and irreligion. Thus, offering prisoners in
faith-based units more or fewer good-time credits or earlier or later parole release than their counterparts in nonfaith-based units would clearly contravene the Establishment Clause.150
As previously noted, there is some evidence that inmates in
faith-based prison units are getting paroled more quickly than
their counterparts in secular prisons."' 1 But the real difficulty is
determining why: is it because the inmates are generally better
able to be reintegrated into society, or because they had opportunities in the faith-based unit unavailable to those in other units,
or because the parole board is using religious affiliation to determine the likelihood the inmate will reoffend?
Ultimately, determining what difference in likelihood of parole is acceptable depends on why prisoners in faith-based units
get paroled earlier than those in traditional prison units. Courts
should determine if the program provides opportunities that substantially increase the likelihood of parole. For example, if prison
regulations require completion of a certain type or number of
education or treatment classes, and it is much easier to fulfill
those requirements while in a faith-based prison or prison unit,
the program runs afoul of the Establishment Clause. The important question is what type of choice is available to the inmate. If
participating in a faith-based prison program provides inmates
with an easier way to fulfill the requirements for parole, either a
substantially less burdensome way to complete the requirements
or a significantly shorter time-frame in which the requirements
could be completed, then the non-faith-based unit is not an adequate substitute for the faith-based one.
To minimize complicated questions about the motives and
prejudices of members of local parole boards, the Establishment
Clause analysis should be limited to two questions: first, is there
clear evidence that the parole board is making decisions on the
basis of a denomination or sect preference; and second, if not,
does the religious program provide a greater likelihood that inmates will complete programs or engage in certain activities that
150

Branham, 37 U Mich J L Ref at 337-38 (cited in note 44). Although Professor

Branham was referring to explicit, guaranteed differences in the length of confinement
and chances of parole between prisoners in secular and sectarian prisons, the argument
should be carried forward to a situation where there are, as a matter of practice and
probability, significant differences in a prisoners chance of parole based on that prisoner's
participation in a faith-based program.
151 See text accompanying notes 48-52.
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make it more likely that they will be paroled or paroled more
quickly than other inmates.
It is doubtlessly true that some parole board members have
religious biases and are more or less willing to parole adherents
of particular faiths. But courts will be understandably wary of
encouraging Establishment Clause challenges to the parole system and the thought-processes of parole board members. In some
circumstances, it might be obvious that a parole board is making
decisions for impermissible religious reasons. If not, courts
should limit their analysis to evaluate what factors parole boards
are explicitly authorized or required to consider, such as the
completion of certain classes or participation in certain activities.
If it is significantly easier to complete these requirements in a
faith-based prison or prison unit than it is in traditional prison
units, the program runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.
The Problem of Higher Quality of Life

C.

Faith-based prisons and prison units offer a variety of benefits to inmates, from religious to secular, significant to trivial." 2
Non-safety and non-parole quality of life enhancement is not as
problematic to faith-based programs' constitutionality as safety
and parole benefits are, but at some point, the difference in quality of life between the religious and nonreligious options violates
the Establishment Clause. The important question is still
whether or not there were "adequate substitutes" available to
prisoners.
Benefits can unconstitutionally coerce prisoners into practicing religion. A prisoner in the general population of a secular
institution will naturally seek any opportunity to gain more privacy, more time with family, better access to education, rehabilitation programs, and vocational training. Thus, it seems unlikely
that there is a "true and private choice" among adequate substitutes if prisoners must choose between a very comfortable existence in a faith-based prison wing or the overcrowded, benefitfree secular alternative. Here, determining "adequate substitute"
becomes much more difficult. A few better meals and a little
more privacy might not be enough to "coerce" an inmate to leave
those he knows and likes in the non-religious prison or prison
unit, to move to a different location further from non-
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incarcerated family or friends, or, more generally, to choose the
unknown.
In her concurrence in Zelman, Justice O'Connor required
that the secular alternatives be "adequate substitutes in the eyes
of parents."15 3 O'Connor explained that the nonreligious choices
available to parents in Cleveland were adequate substitutes because they were able to "compete effectively" with their religious
counterparts.' Traditional prisons might be able to compete effectively with faith-based prisons or prison units, even those that
offer substantial enhancements to inmates' quality of life. It is a
question of degree, a fact-specific inquiry that requires a careful
analysis of all the benefits of residence in each of the available
alternatives. More research is needed to determine why prisoners are choosing faith-based prison options over secular alternatives.
Since an inmate has no constitutional right to live in a particular place or have particular amenities, the scales are not as
likely to tip towards an Establishment Clause violation as when
there is a disparity in safety. But substantial differences in the
quality of life between religious and traditional prisons sometimes should be considered an Establishment Clause violation.
CONCLUSION

Given the failures of corrections departments around the nation,'5 5 it is easy to understand why government officials have
thrown up their hands and given faith-based organizations a
chance to fix a broken system. However, the nation's inability to
prevent prisoners from re-offending does not mean programs like
InnerChange or any of Florida's faith-based prisons are constitutional. These programs might offer a variety of coercive benefits
to inmates, ranging from safety to simple material benefits that
make living in prison more palatable, all for the seemingly small
fee of religious indoctrination.
Although prisoners have more limited constitutional rights,
the deferential standard announced in Turner should not be used
to evaluate challenges to faith-based prison units. Instead these
153 536 US at 670 (O'Connor concurring).
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<http/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism.htm> (last visited on July 28, 2005)
(finding that in a fifteen state study, over two-thirds of released prisoners were rearrested
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programs should be evaluated using the coercion test, as defined
by Justice O'Connor in Zelman. If inmates are unable to make a
true, private and genuine choice between the faith-based program and available alternatives because the alternatives are not
adequate substitutes for the religious option, then the program
should be held violative of the Establishment Clause.

